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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1958
distinction that the defendant therefore did not as a matter of law have a right to have
venue removed to the county of her residence. The change in the statutory language
from "shall" to "may" manifested legislative intent to make the formerly mandatory
provision now merely permissive.
NATURAL RESOURCES
Natural Resources-Right to Waters of Once-Diverted Stream
Flowing in Natural Channel. Wallace v. Weitman' was a contest
concerning the rights of abutting landowners in the waters of an un-
named stream, tributary to the Snake River. One Lee, predecessor in
interest to both plaintiffs and defendants, had owned sixteen hundred
acres of land, including the entire course of the stream. In 1914 he
diverted water from the natural bed of the stream into a ditch on an-
other part of his property, so that all the water flowed through the
ditch into the Snake River and none remained in the natural bed of
the stream at any point below the diversion. Beginning in 1941, Lee
conveyed his land to others in parcels, and through mesne conveyances
plaintiffs acquired land containing the natural stream bed in 1952,
while defendants were granted in 1954 the abutting parcel upon which
was the ditch. At some time between 1914 and 1952, the stream had
been rediverted into its natural channel, since at the time plaintiffs
went into possession, the stream was again in its natural bed. The
original diversion had taken place above the land of either of the
present parties, but still on part of the land which the common prede-
cessor had owned. No part of the natural stream bed was located on
the defendants' land. Defendants proceeded, at a point above plain-
tiffs' boundary, to divert the stream back into the old ditch, pursuant
to a permit granted by the supervisor of water resources. Plaintiffs
at no time had a permit; they claimed as riparians.
Later in 1955 plaintiffs applied for, and were granted, an injunction
which commanded defendants to allow plaintiffs a suffcient constant
flow of water to supply fifty head of cattle. In so acting, the trial court
sustained plaintiffs' demurrer to an affirmative defense of prior appro-
priation and excluded the testimony of three witnesses, which would
have tended to prove that plaintiffs' land was not riparian to the
stream. While affirming the decree, the supreme court skirted discus-
sion upon, and left unanswered, several difficult problems in Wash-
ington water rights law, preferring instead to rely upon the rather
incomplete findings of fact obtained at the trial.'
1 152 Wash. Dec. 514, 328 P.2d 157 (1958).
2 152 Wash. Dec. 514, 516, 328 P.2d 157, 158 (1958).
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The problems presented include the following: 1) Whether plain-
tiffs' land was in fact riparian to the stream; 2) whether either the
1914 or the 1955 diversion of water from the natural channel was, as
defendants contend, a valid appropriation; 3) whether the 1917
Water Code' had any effect on any of the later reroutings of water
between the two courses; and 4) whether, in any event, a decree can
be had apportioning the rights of the parties in the water involved.
These considerations are quite interrelated and must be treated simul-
taneously.
Generally, the law of water rights in Washington is a product of
several influences,4 some of which include: Federal law pursuant to
acquistion of the northwestern corner of the United States'; terri-
torial law of Oregon and, later, Washington territories6 ; the consti-
tution7 and laws of the State of Washington; the common law'; and
the necessity of water for irrigation and mining, which is peculiar to
the arid land of the Western United States.9
The riparian right is an incident of ownership of land abutting a
non-navigable stream or lake and is real property."0 Essentially, the
riparian owner is entitled to the use of all the waters of a stream for
domestic uses" and to a reasonable beneficial use for such purposes
as irrigation. There have been dicta in Washington that domestic
uses are superior to irrigation uses. Without a showing of actual
damage, a lower riparian has an absolute right to enjoin a non-riparian,
non-permit appropriation. 4
If plaintiffs' land was riparian to the stream, it becomes evident
that, subject to existing modifications, they were entitled to the entire,
undiminished flow of its waters, rather than merely the by-pass
decreed by the trial court. If defendants' land was not riparian to
3 Now codified as RCW Title 90, WATER RIGHTS.
4 For a more thorough coverage than is expedient here, see Horowitz, Riparian and
Appropriation Rights to the Use of Water in; Washington, 7 WASH. L. REv. 197
(1932).
5 Under the June 15, 1846, treaty with England.
6 In 1856 the territorial legislature of Washington abrogated Oregon law then in
Washington Territory by the provision (Sess. Laws 1856-6 p. 2), "That the common
law, in all civil cases, except where otherwise provided by law shall be in force."
7 WAs H. CONST. Art. I § 16.
8 See Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897).
9 Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 282-3, 49 Pac. 495, 498 (1897), and cases cited
therein.
10 United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 124 F. Supp. 818 (WD Wash. 1954).
11 Hunter Land Co. v. Langenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926). These uses
include cleaning, household and culinary uses, and the feeding of livestock.
12 Nesalhous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1032 (1907).
13 State ex reL. Kennewick Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 118 Wash. 517, 217 Pac.
23 (1923).
14 Mally v. Wiedensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
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the stream and if, as discussed below, there was no valid appropria-
tion, it would not be improper to take away irrigation waters com-
pletely." Pursuing this premise, the redefinition of riparian rights
in Brown v. Chase,6 to the effect that the riparian owner had the
right only to that amount of water which he could beneficially use,
would allow defendants the mere possibility, by a legal appropriation,
of using for irrigation only as much water as plaintiffs could not bene-
ficially use. The permit to divert water, which was applied for by
defendants' immediate grantor and issued to defendants, would be
of no practical effect if plaintiffs were making a beneficial use of the
entire flow of the stream.' The permit not only allowed to defend-
ants more water than flowed in the stream", but also was in derogation
of the property right" plaintiffs had as riparian owners.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine chronologically, so far
as available facts disclose, the claims of the respective parties. Claims
to the stream must arise from among four possibilities: (1) As a
riparian"; or as an appropriator under (2) custom," (3) notice,"
or (4) permit."
When Lee made the diversion in 1914, the land was riparian to
the stream in its entirety, and remained so until he conveyed parcels
of it not continguous to the stream. The parcels abutting the stream
remained riparian. The opinion and briefs are unclear as to what
point in time the water ceased to be diverted into the ditch and was
restored to its natural course. However, plaintiffs, whose title ante-
dated that of defendants, purchased land over which the stream was
then flowing and over which it had formerly naturally flowed. De-
fendants' land, although riparian when in the possession of Lee, was
no longer riparian, as it was not, at the time defendants purchased it,
1 ln Alexander v. Mluenscher, 7 Wn.2d 557, 561, 110 P.2d 625, 628 (1941), the
court said, "Non-riparian owners have no right to divert water from a watercourse
even though they are using it by grant or license from a riparian owner."
16 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
17 Issuance of the permit is not an adjudication of private rights, Funk v. Bartholet,
157 Wash. 584, 289 Pac. 1018 (1930). See also Eikenbary v. Calispel Light & Power
Co., 132 Wash. 255, 231 Pac. 946 (1925), which holds that issuance of the permit does
not preclude the diverter from liability to the riparian owner for wrongful diversion.
18 "This permit was for .46 cfs of water, which was more than the stream flowed."
Brief of Appellants, P.10, Wallace v. Weitman, 152 Wash. Dec. 514, 328 P.2d 157
(1958).
"0 Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897).
20 The riparian right may be divided into two subclassifications: (a) use, (b) con-
sumptive. This dichotomy is created purely for the purposes of this Note.21 Appropriation by custom has been recognized in Washington from the earliest
date. Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566, 20 Pac. 588 (1889).
2- The notice system was instituted by Laws of 1891, c. 21, and was superseded by
the 1917 Water Code. See In re Icicle Creek, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930).
23 RCW 90.04.020.
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continguous to the stream, having been severed in an earlier convey-
ance. Once severed from the stream, the land can never be restored
to its riparian character, even by acquisition of a corridor.24 Presum-
ably defendants' grantor, Eggers, had the same non-riparian status,
else he would not have applied for the permit.
Defendants' claim: Defendants could not claim as riparians since
their parcel of land had been severed from the stream.2" As to appro-
priative rights, there was no appropriation by custom, the original
mode of appropriation, which required an intent to appropriate and
reasonable diligence thereafter in applying the water to a beneficial
use.2" No appropriation by this method was valid after the permit
system was instituted in 1917,27 and the 1914 appropriation did not
qualify, as it did not take place on public land. 8 No appropriation
by notice could be contended, since there was no notice posted at the
point of the 1914 diversion.29 Thus, the only appropriation under
which defendants might have claimed was that pursuant to the permit
issued. This, too, must be ruled out, since an existing riparian right
cannot be defeated by a subsequent appropriation"9 and because the
Code did not alter rights existing prior to its enactment."' Addition-
ally, any appropriative use of water without prior procurement of a
valid permit is a misdemeanor under the Code.2
Plaintiffs' claim. The claim of plaintiffs, when held up to the above
criteria, has substance. Although an appriative right was neither
claimed nor discovered, the riparian right incident to their land was
never lost. Owning the land bordering the stream, plaintiffs' right
extended at least to the use of the water as it flowed by. 3 Whether
plaintiffs' consumptive right 4 could have been terminated by bene-
ficial use of the waters of the stream on non-riparian land is an open
question in Washington and one which the court did not consider in
24 Mally v. Wiedensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915) ; Yearsley v. Cater,
149 Wash. 285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
25 Note 24, mpra.
26In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).
27 RCW 90.04.020.
2 8 Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897).
29 See note 22, supra.
30 Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913).
31 RCW 90.04.020 states, "Nothing in this title shall lessen, enlarge, or modify the
rights of a riparian owner existing as of June 6, 1917, . .
32 RCW 90.32.010.
33 E.g., for such purposes as fishing, bathing, washing clothes. This elementary use
may extend to the taking of small quantities from the stream for culinary uses or
watering domestic animals.
34 Note 20, supro.
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the instant case. The history of the use of the stream between 1941
and 1952 is not in the record, so no generalization is possible.
Assuming that proper application of the law vested both the use
iight and the consumptive right in plaintiffs, subject to the beneficial
use limitation previously noted," plaintiffs still may not be able to
use the stream for livestock watering without a permit, since the
statute,"0 in referring to "any person," does not exclude riparian
owners from its requirements." The consumption of water from a
stream by a herd of livestock is usually deemed an appropriation."8
The injunction granted plaintiffs was therefore consonant with the
general rule that a riparian can enjoin a non-riparian from diverting
water, even when the diversion does not injure the riparian." How-
ever, since the land was arid and practically useless without water,
some provision could have been made to allow use of the surplus by
defendants. Drafting the decree to conform with the law would have
appropriately provided for the parties. Control over the stream should
have remained in plaintiffs, the riparian owners, with the surplus then
allocated to defendants. Both would need permits for their respective
uses.
From the state of the evidence gathered, only partial answers can
be suggested to the four questions posed earlier. It is submitted that
whatever authority there is in Wallace v. Weitman must be restricted
to congruent factual situations." STANLEY B. ALLPER
PARTINRSHIPS
Partnership-Contribution to Loss in Absence of Agreement. The recent case of
Richert v. Handly, 153 Wash. Dec. 104, 330 P.2d 1079 (1958), was an action for an
accounting and dissolution of a logging partnership in which one of the partners con-
tributed the capital, while the other agreed to manage the concern. The receipts of
the partnership were not sufficient to cover the capital contribution. Upon finding that
the parties had not agreed upon a basis for sharing losses or whether the claims of
one partner were to take priority over the claims of the other, the trial court concluded
35 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
36 RCW 90.20.010. However, if plaintiffs' riparian right dates prior to 1917, a per-
mit may not be needed.
37 After 1917 even a riparian owner could not appropriate without a permit. Proctor
v. Sim, 134 Vash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
:1 Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulely, 53 Nev. 163, 295 Pac. 772 (1931); Empire
Water Co. v. Cascade, 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
30 See, e.g., Mally v. Viedensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
40 For an authoritative treatment of the general subject of water rights in Wash-
ington, see Horowitz, Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water in Wash-
ington, 1 VAsH. L. Rav. 197 (1932) ; Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch,
31 WAsH. L. REv. 243 (1956).
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